





The Impact of No Child Left Behind 
on Students, Teachers, and Schools
ABSTRACT The controversial No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) brought
test-based school accountability to scale across the United States. This study
draws together results from multiple data sources to identify how the new
accountability systems developed in response to NCLB have inﬂuenced stu-
dent achievement, school-district ﬁnances, and measures of school and teacher
practices. Our results indicate that NCLB brought about targeted gains in the
mathematics achievement of younger students, particularly those from dis-
advantaged backgrounds. However, we ﬁnd no evidence that NCLB improved
student achievement in reading. School-district expenditure increased signiﬁ-
cantly in response to NCLB, and these increases were not matched by federal
revenue. Our results suggest that NCLB led to increases in teacher compensa-
tion and the share of teachers with graduate degrees. We ﬁnd evidence that
NCLB shifted the allocation of instructional time toward math and reading, the
subjects targeted by the new accountability systems.
T
he No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001 is arguably the most far-
reaching education policy initiative in the United States over the last
four decades. The hallmark features of this legislation compelled states to
conduct annual student assessments linked to state standards, to identify
schools that are failing to make “adequate yearly progress” (AYP), and to
institute sanctions and rewards based on each school’s AYP status. A fun-
damental motivation for this reform is the notion that publicizing detailed
information on school-speciﬁc test performance and linking that perfor-
mance to the possibility of meaningful sanctions can improve the focus
and productivity of public schools.
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charge that NCLB has led educators to shift resources away from impor-
tant but nontested subjects, such as social studies, art, and music, and to
focus instruction within mathematics and reading on the relatively narrow
set of topics that are most heavily represented on the high-stakes tests
(Rothstein, Jacobsen, and Wilder 2008, Koretz 2008). In the extreme,
some suggest that high-stakes testing may lead school personnel to inten-
tionally manipulate student test scores (Jacob and Levitt 2003). Although
there have been hundreds of studies of test-based accountability policies
in the United States over the past two decades, the evidence on NCLB is
more limited, both because it is a newer policy and because the national
scope of the policy makes it extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd an adequate control
group by which to assess the national policy.
This paper examines the impact NCLB has had on students, teachers,
and schools across the country. We investigate not only how NCLB has
inﬂuenced student achievement, but also how it has affected education
spending, instructional practice, and school organization. Given the com-
plexity of the policy and the nature of its implementation, we are skeptical
that any single analysis can be deﬁnitive. For this reason we present a
broad collage of evidence and look for consistent patterns.
Several ﬁndings emerge. First, the weight of the evidence suggests that
NCLB has had a positive effect on elementary student performance in
mathematics, particularly at the lower grades. The beneﬁts appear to be
concentrated among traditionally disadvantaged populations, with particu-
larly large effects among Hispanic students. We do not ﬁnd evidence that
the policy has adversely affected achievement at either the top or the bot-
tom end of the test-score distribution. Instead, the policy-induced gains in
math performance appear similar across the test-score distribution. How-
ever, the available evidence suggests that NCLB did not have a compara-
ble effect on reading performance.
A closer look at the potential mechanisms behind the observed improve-
ment provides some additional insight. For example, we ﬁnd evidence that
NCLB increased average school district expenditure by nearly $600 per
pupil. This increased expenditure was allocated both to direct student
instruction and to educational support services. We also find that this
increased expenditure was not matched by corresponding increases in
federal support. The test-score gains associated with these expenditure
increases fall short of the ambitious goals enshrined in NCLB. However,
we present some qualiﬁed evidence suggesting that the size of the gains
reﬂects a reasonable return on investment.
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tive measures of educational practice and student outcomes. This evi-
dence suggests that NCLB led to an increase in the share of teachers with
master’s degrees. We also ﬁnd evidence that teachers responded to NCLB
by reallocating instructional time from social studies and science toward
key tested subjects, particularly reading. We also present evidence that
NCLB led to distinct improvements in a teacher-reported index of student
behaviors (which covers, among other things, attendance, timeliness, and
intellectual interest) commonly understood as measuring “behavioral
engagement” with school.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I outlines the theoretical under-
pinnings of school accountability and provides background on the NCLB
legislation. Section II examines the impact of NCLB on student achieve-
ment, marshaling evidence from a variety of different sources. Section III
investigates potential mediating mechanisms, discussing how the policy
affected educational expenditure, classroom instruction, and school orga-
nization, among other things. Section IV concludes with recommendations
for future policy and research.
I. Background on School Accountability and NCLB
NCLB represented a bold new foray into education policy on the part of
the federal government. However, the provisions it embodied built on a
long history of reforms in standards and accountability at the state and
local levels over several decades.
I.A. Theoretical Underpinnings of School Accountability
A basic perception that has motivated the widespread adoption of
school accountability policies like NCLB is that the system of public ele-
mentary and secondary schooling in the United States is “fragmented and
incoherent” (Ladd 2007, p. 2). In particular, proponents of school account-
ability reforms argue that too many schools, particularly those serving the
most at-risk students, have been insufﬁciently focused on their core perfor-
mance objectives, and that this organizational slack reﬂected weak incen-
tives and a lack of accountability among teachers and school administrators.
For example, Eric Hanushek and Margaret Raymond (2001, pp. 368–69)
write that accountability policies are “premised on an assumption that a
focus on student outcomes will lead to behavioral changes by students,
teachers, and schools to align with the performance goals of the system”
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fixes to any observed performance problems.”
The theoretical framework implicitly suggested by this characteriza-
tion of public schools is a principal-agent model: the interests of teachers
and school administrators, the agents in this framework, are viewed as
imperfectly aligned with those of parents and voters. Furthermore, parents
and voters cannot easily monitor or evaluate the input decisions made by
these agents. The performance-based sanctions and rewards that charac-
terize accountability policies are effectively output-based incentives that
can be understood as a potential policy response to this agency problem.
Similarly, some of the provisions in NCLB with regard to teacher qualiﬁ-
cations can be construed as an agent selection approach to a principal-
agent problem.
The principal-agent lens is also useful for understanding criticisms of
accountability-based reforms. The assumption that the self-interest of
teachers and administrators is misaligned implies that they may respond to
accountability policies in unintentionally narrow or even counterproduc-
tive ways. For example, in the presence of a high-stakes performance
threshold, schools may reallocate instructional effort away from high- and
low-performing students and toward the “bubble kids”—those most likely,
with additional attention, to meet the proﬁciency standard (see, for exam-
ple, Neal and Schanzenbach 2010). Similarly, concerns about “teaching to
the test” reﬂect the view that schools will refocus their instructional effort
on the potentially narrow cognitive skills targeted by their high-stakes
state assessment, at the expense of broader and more genuine improve-
ments in cognitive achievement. Schools may also reallocate instructional
effort away from academic subjects that are not tested, or even attempt to
shape the test-taking population in advantageous ways.
I.B. Research on Accountability Reforms Adopted by States 
before NCLB
School accountability reforms similar to those brought about by NCLB
were adopted in a number of states during the 1990s. Several studies have
evaluated the achievement consequences of these reforms. Because of the
similarities between NCLB and aspects of these pre-NCLB accountability
systems, this body of research provides a useful backdrop against which to
consider the potential achievement impacts of NCLB. In a recent review of
this diverse evaluation literature, David Figlio and Helen Ladd (2007) suggest
that three studies (Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Jacob 2005, and Hanushek and
Raymond 2005) are the “most methodologically sound” (Ladd 2007, p. 9).
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level achievement data from the National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP), found that the within-state improvement in math perfor-
mance between 1996 and 2000 was larger in states with higher values on
an accountability index, particularly for black and Hispanic students in
eighth grade.
1 Similarly, Jacob (2005) found that, following the introduc-
tion of an accountability policy, math and reading achievement increased
in the Chicago public schools, relative both to prior trends and to con-
temporaneous changes in other large urban districts in the region. How-
ever, Jacob (2005) also found that younger students did not experience
similar gains on a state-administered, low-stakes exam and that teachers
responded strategically to accountability pressures (for example, increas-
ing special education placements).
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) evaluated the impact of school account-
ability policies on state-level NAEP math and reading achievement, as
measured by the difference between the performance of a state’s eighth-
graders and that of fourth-graders in the same state 4 years earlier. This
gain-score approach applied to the NAEP data implied that there were two
cohorts of state-level observations in both math (1992–96 and 1996–2000)
and reading (1994–98 and 1998–2002). Hanushek and Raymond (2005)
classiﬁed state accountability policies as implementing either “report-card
accountability” or “consequential accountability.” States with report-card
accountability provided a public report of school-level test performance,
whereas states with consequential accountability both publicized school-
level performance and could attach consequences to that performance.
The types of potential consequences were diverse. However, virtually all
of the systems in consequential accountability states included key ele-
ments of the school accountability provisions later enacted in NCLB (for
example, identifying failing schools, replacing principals, allowing stu-
dents to enroll elsewhere, and taking over, closing, or reconstituting
schools). Hanushek and Raymond (2005, p. 307) note that “all states are
now effectively consequential accountability states (at least as soon as they
phase in NCLB).”
Hanushek and Raymond (2005) ﬁnd that the introduction of consequen-
tial accountability within a state was associated with statistically signiﬁcant
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and combined information on whether a state required student testing and performance
reporting to the state, whether the state imposed sanctions or rewards, and whether the state
required students to pass an exit exam to graduate from high school.
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consequential accountability were particularly large for Hispanic stu-
dents and, to a lesser extent, white students. However, the estimated
effects for the gain scores of black students were statistically insigniﬁcant,
as were the estimated effects of report-card accountability. The authors
argue that these achievement results provide support for the controversial
school accountability provisions in NCLB, because those provisions are so
similar to the consequential accountability policies that had been adopted
in some states.
I.C. Key Features of the NCLB Legislation
The NCLB legislation was actually a reauthorization of the historic Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the central federal legisla-
tion relevant to K-12 schooling. The ESEA, ﬁrst enacted in 1965 along
with other Great Society initiatives and previously reauthorized in 1994,
introduced Title I, the federal government’s signature program for target-
ing ﬁnancial assistance to schools and school districts serving high con-
centrations of economically disadvantaged students. NCLB dramatically
expanded the scope and scale of this federal legislation by requiring that
states introduce school accountability systems that applied to all public
schools and their students in the state. In particular, NCLB requires annual
testing of public-school students in reading and mathematics in grades 3
through 8 (and at least once in grades 10 through 12), and that states rate
each school, both as a whole and for key subgroups of students, with
regard to whether they are making “adequate yearly progress” toward their
state’s proﬁciency goals.
NCLB also requires that states introduce “sanctions and rewards” rel-
evant to every school and based on their AYP status. It mandates explicit
and increasingly severe sanctions (from implementing public-school
choice to staff replacement to school restructuring) for persistently low-
performing schools that receive Title I aid. According to data from the
Schools and Stafﬁng Survey of the National Center for Education Statis-
tics, 54.4 percent of public schools participated in Title I services during
the 2003–04 school year. Some states applied these explicit sanctions to
schools not receiving Title I assistance as well. For example, 24 states
introduced accountability systems that threatened all low-performing
schools with reconstitution, regardless of whether they received Title I
assistance.
2
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The overarching goal of NCLB has been to drive broad and substantive
improvements in student achievement. This section discusses the available
empirical evidence on the achievement effects of NCLB, drawing on a
variety of research designs and data sources including national time trends,
comparisons between private and public schools, and comparisons across
schools and states.
II.A. National Time Trends in Student Achievement
Because NCLB was introduced simultaneously throughout the United
States, many observers have turned to state and national time-series trends
in student achievement to assess its impact. For example, several studies
have noted that student achievement, particularly as measured by state
assessment systems, appears to have improved both overall and for key
subgroups since the implementation of NCLB (Center on Education Policy
2008b). Others, however, argue that changes in student performance on
high-stakes state tests can be highly misleading when states strategically
adjust their assessment systems and teachers narrow their instructional
focus to state-tested content (Fuller and others 2007).
Figure 1 presents data on national trends in student achievement from
1992 to 2007. These data are from the main NAEP and provide separate
trends by grade (fourth and eighth), by subject (math and reading), and by
race and ethnicity (white, black, and Hispanic).
3 These trends suggest that
NCLB may have increased the math performance of fourth-graders. That
is, these NAEP data suggest that fourth-grade math achievement has
shifted noticeably higher during the NCLB era and may have also begun
trending upward more aggressively. The trend data suggest similar gains in
the math performance of black eighth-graders. However, the trends pro-
vide no clear suggestion that the onset of NCLB improved performance in
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3. There are several different versions of the NAEP. The original NAEP, first admin-
istered in the early 1970s, is now called the Long-Term Trend (LTT) NAEP, because the
Department of Education has made an effort to keep the content of this examination as con-
sistent as possible over time in order to accurately gauge national trends. The LTT NAEP is
administered to a small random sample of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-olds across the country and
generally focuses on what many educators now think of as “basic” skills. What is now
called the main NAEP was initiated in the early 1990s in an effort both to update the con-
tent and format of the national assessment so as test a broader domain of knowledge and
skills, and to allow individual states to obtain their own, state-representative estimates.
This exam is administered to fourth and eighth graders (and more recently to twelfth-
graders).
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the other three grade-subject combinations. Figure 2 shows achievement
growth for 9- and 13-year-olds in math and reading, using data from 
the Long-Term Trend (LTT) NAEP, which has tracked student perfor-
mance from the early 1970s. These data similarly suggest that the effects
of NCLB on student achievement have been at best limited to certain
groups.
II.B. Evidence from International Comparisons
Although these national achievement trends are suggestive, they do not
necessarily provide the basis for reliable inferences about the impact of
NCLB. Simple time-series comparisons may be biased by the achievement
consequences of other time-varying determinants, such as the recession
Source: National Center for Education Statistics. 
a. Data are for all public schools.



































1994 1998 2002 2006
Figure 1. Mean Scaled Scores on the Main NAEP, by Ethnicity, 1992–2007a
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benchmark the achievement trends observed in the United States is to
compare them with the contemporaneous trends in other countries.
Because the time-series evidence in figure 1 suggests that any posi-
tive achievement effects from NCLB were likely to have been concen-
trated in fourth-grade math achievement, the comparative international
achievement data from the Trends in International Mathematics and Sci-
ence Study (TIMSS) are particularly relevant. The TIMSS collected
trend data on fourth-grade math achievement for participating countries
in 1995, 2003, and 2007. The top panel in figure 3 presents the fourth-
grade scale scores in math from the TIMSS for the United States, for the
12 other countries that collected these performance data in each of these
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Source: National Center for Education Statistics. 
a. Data are for all public schools.
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Figure 2. Mean Scaled Scores on the Long-Term Trend NAEP, by Ethnicity, 1978–2004a
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are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD).
These trend data indicate that average math achievement on the TIMSS
fell for all sets of countries by roughly equal amounts between the only
available pre-NCLB year (1995) and the first academic year in which
158 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
Source: National Center for Education Statistics. 
a. The TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study) is an international assessment 
of the mathematics and science knowledge of fourth- and eighth-grade students, administered every 4 
years since 1995. The PIRLS (Progress in International Reading Literacy Study) is an international 
assessment of the literacy achievement of fourth-grade students, administered every 5 years since 2001. 
Both studies are conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achieve-
ment. 
b. Australia, England, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Scotland.
c. Countries in note b plus Iran, Latvia, Singapore, and Slovenia.
d. England, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, 
Slovak Republic, and Sweden. 
e. Countries in note d plus Bulgaria, Hong Kong, Iran, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 























Figure 3. Mean Scaled Scores of Fourth-Graders on the TIMSS and the PIRLS in the
United States and Other Countries
a
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cannot assess the extent to which these comparative changes deviate from
pre-NCLB trends. However, the available TIMSS data indicate that, by
2007, math achievement had comparatively improved in the United States,
particularly with respect to the other OECD countries (an improvement of
11 scale points versus 4). These cross-country trends provide suggestive
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that NCLB led to improvements in
the math performance of younger students in the United States. However,
the comparative test-score gain for the United States is relatively modest,
amounting to only a 1.35 percent increase in average performance over
pre-NCLB scores, and an 8 percent increase relative to the standard devia-
tion in test scores.
Moreover, like the national time-series evidence, international com-
parisons provide no indication that NCLB improved the reading achieve-
ment of young students. The Progress in International Reading Literacy
Study (PIRLS) reports data on the reading achievement of fourth-graders
across a number of countries both in 2001 and in 2006. The bottom
panel of figure 3 presents overall reading scores from the PIRLS by year
for the United States, the group of 26 other countries that participated in
both surveys, and the OECD members of this comparison group. On
average, the United States outperformed these comparison countries.
However, over the period that NCLB was implemented, all three sets of
countries experienced quite similar and modest changes in PIRLS read-
ing achievement.
Overall, then, the international evidence is at best suggestive. Contem-
poraneous changes within other countries may make them a poor compar-
ison group for evaluating NCLB. The lack of multiple years of data also
makes it difﬁcult to distinguish possible policy effects from other trends
or to identify any comparative differences with statistical precision. A
subtler shortcoming of national and international time-series comparisons
is that the presumption of a common, national effect ignores the possibil-
ity of heterogeneous effects of NCLB across particular types of states and
schools.
II.C. Evidence from Accountability Risk Studies
However, several recent econometric studies have creatively leveraged
this heterogeneity to identify the effects of NCLB. In particular, a widely
used approach involves structuring comparisons across schools or students
that face different risks of sanctions under NCLB. Derek Neal and Diane
Schanzenbach (2010) present evidence that following the introduction of
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the proﬁciency threshold (that is, those in the middle of the distribution)
improved while the performance of those at the bottom of the distribu-
tion remained the same or fell. Using data from the state of Washington,
John Krieg (2008) finds that the performance of students in both tails of
the distribution is lower when their school faces the possibility of NCLB
sanctions.
Dale Ballou and Matthew Springer (2008), using data from a low-
stakes exam fielded in seven states over a 4-year period, identify the
achievement consequences of NCLB by constructing comparisons across
grade-year cells that were included in AYP calculations and those that
were not. Their approach takes advantage of the fact that between 2002–03
and 2005–06, states differed with respect to whether particular grades
mattered for a school’s accountability rating. Hence, their identification
strategy leverages the fact that if the math scores of fourth-graders
counted toward a school’s accountability rating in one year but the math
scores of ﬁfth-graders in the same school did not count until the following
year, one would expect student achievement to rise more quickly among
fourth-graders relative to fifth-graders in the current year. Ballou and
Springer ﬁnd that the presence of AYP accountability modestly increased
the math achievement of elementary-school students, particularly lower-
performing students.
A recent study by Randall Reback, Jonah Rockoff, and Heather
Schwartz (2010) adopts a similar approach, comparing student performance
across elementary schools on the margin of making AYP. Using nationally
representative data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS),
they ﬁnd that reading and science scores on low-stakes tests improve by as
much as 0.07 standard deviation when a school is on the margin for mak-
ing AYP, but that the effects on math scores are smaller and statistically
insigniﬁcant.
These accountability risk studies provide credible evidence on how
NCLB-induced pressure inﬂuences the level and the distribution of student
achievement. However, they have at least three potential limitations with
respect to understanding the broad achievement consequences of NCLB.
First, most of these studies have limited external validity because they do
not rely on national data. Second, some rely on high-stakes assessments,
which may not accurately reﬂect true student ability in the presence of
strategic responses to NCLB (such as teaching to the test). Third, and
perhaps most important, the treatment contrast in these studies may not
approximate the full impact of NCLB because they rely on comparisons
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
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policy regime. To the extent that NCLB had broad effects on public
schools (that is, even on students and schools not under the direct threat of
sanctions), these comparisons could understate the effects of interest.
II.D. Evidence from a Comparison of States over Time
To address some of the limitations described above and estimate what
one might consider the “full” impact of NCLB, we utilize a strategy that
compares changes in student performance within states over time (see Dee
and Jacob forthcoming). We take advantage of the fact that NCLB was
explicitly modeled on an earlier generation of state-level school account-
ability systems. In the decade before NCLB, about 30 states implemented
consequential school accountability policies that were fundamentally sim-
ilar to NCLB in that they mandated systematic testing of students in read-
ing and math, public reporting of school performance on these exams,
and the possibility of meaningful sanctions (including school takeover,
closure, or reconstitution, replacing the principal, and allowing students to
change schools) based on test-based school performance. In fact, some
state ofﬁcials argued that NCLB needlessly duplicates preexisting state
accountability systems.
4
The existence of these earlier NCLB-like accountability systems estab-
lishes natural treatment and control state groups. In our framework, states
that adopted NCLB-like accountability before NCLB form our control
group. Other states, for which NCLB catalyzed an entirely new experi-
ence with consequential school accountability, form our treatment group.
5
Of course, states that adopted accountability programs before NCLB were
not randomly distributed. For this reason our “comparative interrupted
time series” (CITS) strategy, described in more detail below, relies on
within-state variation over time, allowing not only for different levels of
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4. Michael Dobbs, “Conn. Stands in Deﬁance of Enforcing ‘No Child.’ ” Washington
Post, May 8, 2005.
5. We relied on a number of different sources to categorize pre-NCLB accountability
policies across states, including prior studies of such policies (for example, Carnoy and
Loeb 2002, Lee and Wong 2004, and Hanushek and Raymond 2005) as well as primary
sources such as the Quality Counts series put out by Education Week (“Quality Counts ’99,”
January 11, 1999, www.edcounts.org/archive/sreports/qc99/), the state-speciﬁc “Account-
ability and Assessment Proﬁles” assembled by the Consortium for Policy Research in Edu-
cation (Goertz, Duffy, and Le Floch 2001), annual surveys on state student assessment
programs ﬁelded by the Council of Chief State School Ofﬁcers, information from state edu-
cation department websites, Lexis-Nexis searches of state and local newspapers, and con-
versations with academics and state ofﬁcials in several states.
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achievement across states before NCLB.
GRAPHICAL EVIDENCE. We illustrate the logic of our identiﬁcation strat-
egy through a series of ﬁgures. This graphical evidence has the advantages
of transparency and simplicity. We then present regression estimates that
more clearly show the magnitude and statistical precision of our ﬁndings
and allow us to demonstrate that the results are robust to a variety of alter-
native speciﬁcations and several falsiﬁcation exercises.
Figure 4 shows the trends in NAEP scores for two groups: states that
had adopted school accountability by 1998 (control states), and states that
162 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
Source: National Center for Education Statistics and authors’calculations.
a. Data are for public schools only. Treatment states are those that did not adopt consequential school
accountability policies before NCLB, and control states those that had adopted such policies before
1998. A small number of states that adopted accountability programs between 1999 and 2001 are
excluded.
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Figure 4. Mean Scaled Scores on the Main NAEP, by Timing of Increased School
Accountability, 1992–2007
a
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The NAEP data are particularly well suited to this evaluation for several
reasons. First, the NAEP is a technically well-developed assessment that
covers a broad domain of knowledge and schools. Second, it provides
consistent, state-representative measures of student performance for most
states over the last two decades. Finally, the exam is a low-stakes exam for
students, teachers, and schools.
7 Because teachers have no incentive to
“teach to” the NAEP, it is likely to provide the most accurate measure of
student achievement (Fuller and others 2007).
The ﬁgure plots the simple (unweighted) average scale score of each
group of states in all years in which the exam was administered. Years are
identiﬁed by the spring of the relevant academic year (for example, “1992”
refers to the 1991–92 school year). The sample of states is consistent
across years (that is, it is a balanced panel), and the state classiﬁcation is a
time-invariant characteristic. Data points to the left of the vertical line that
indicates the enactment of NCLB are considered “pre-policy,” and those to
the right “post-policy.”
8 To illustrate the pre- and post-NCLB achievement
trends within each group, we also plot the ﬁtted regression line from a sim-
ple linear regression conducted separately for each group × period (pre- or
post-NCLB).
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6. These ﬁgures exclude a small number of states that adopted state accountability pro-
grams between 1999 and 2001, in order to make a clear distinction between our treatment
and comparison groups. However, the regression analysis described in the following sec-
tion includes these “late adopter” states. Dee and Jacob (forthcoming) show that the inclu-
sion of these late adopters does not change the ﬁndings in any substantive way.
7. That is, the NAEP is not used as the basis for student promotion or retention, teacher
evaluation, or school accountability. Indeed, the NAEP is administered only to a small, ran-
dom sample of fourth-, eighth-, and twelfth-grade students in each state.
8. When one dates the start of NCLB is a potentially important issue. NCLB secured
ﬁnal congressional approval on December 18, 2001, and was signed by President George
W. Bush on January 8, 2002, both events thus occurring in the middle of the 2001–02 aca-
demic year. NCLB is often characterized as having been implemented during 2002–03
because states were required to use testing outcomes from the previous academic year as
the starting point for determining whether a school was making adequate yearly progress
(Palmer and Coleman 2003; Lynn Olson, “States Strive toward ESEA Compliance,” Edu-
cation Week, December 1, 2002). However, one could reasonably conjecture that the dis-
cussion and anticipation surrounding the adoption of NCLB would have inﬂuenced school
performance during the 2001–02 school year. Alternatively, it could also be argued that
NCLB should not be viewed as in effect until the 2003–04 academic year, when new state
accountability systems were more fully implemented as well as more informed by guid-
ance from and negotiations with the U.S. Department of Education (Lynn Olson, “States
Strive toward ESEA Compliance,” Education Week, December 1, 2002; Olson, “Taking
Root,” Education Week, December 8, 2004). For a more detailed discussion, see Dee and
Jacob (forthcoming).
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achievement, shows that in 1992, states that did not adopt accountability
until NCLB scored roughly 5 scale points (0.18 standard deviation) higher
on average than states that adopted school accountability policies by 1998.
Although both groups of states made modest gains between 1992 and
2000, the group that adopted accountability policies before 1998 experi-
enced more rapid improvement during this period.
9
If the NCLB accountability provisions had an impact on student perfor-
mance, one would expect achievement to increase more after 2002 in
states with no prior accountability than in states with prior accountability.
It is possible that NCLB led to a level shift in student achievement, which
would be manifest as a shift in the intercept after NCLB. It is also possible
that NCLB changed the rate of achievement growth, which would be
manifest as a change in the slope of the achievement trend after NCLB.
10
Whether one considers a shift in the intercept or a change in the slope,
our identification strategy relies on a comparison of treatment versus
control states that accounts not only for the pre-NCLB levels of achieve-
ment in each group but also for the pre-NCLB achievement trends in
each group.
The top left panel of figure 4 shows that the mean level of math
achievement jumped noticeably in 2003 for both groups of states. How-
ever, relative to prior trends, this shift was larger among the “no prior
accountability” group (the treatment states). Interestingly, there was little
noticeable change in the growth rate across periods for the states with prior
accountability (the control states): the slope of the achievement trend for
this group is roughly the same before and after 2002. In contrast, achieve-
ment rose more rapidly in states with no prior accountability from 2003 to
2007 than from 1992 through 2000, such that the growth rates after 2002
were roughly equivalent across both groups of states. These trends suggest
that NCLB had a positive impact on fourth-grade math achievement.
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9. This visual evidence is consistent with the earlier evaluation literature that studied
pre-NCLB state accountability reforms (for example, Carnoy and Loeb 2002, Jacob 2005,
and Hanushek and Raymond 2005).
10. The rate of achievement growth might have increased after NCLB for several rea-
sons. First, it may take states time to implement new curricula, instructional strategies, or
other support services for students. Second, later cohorts of students will have been
“exposed” to NCLB for a larger fraction of their school careers than earlier cohorts. With-
out imposing additional assumptions, we cannot cleanly distinguish between these effects.
For this reason we focus on the “net” impact of NCLB in different years after the legisla-
tion was passed.
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ilar to those for fourth-grade math, although less pronounced. The pattern
for fourth-grade reading (top right panel of ﬁgure 4) is much less clear.
The pre-NCLB reading trends for both groups are much noisier than the
math trends. In particular, the two groups both experienced a decline in
achievement in 1994 and then diverged in 1998, but both had made very
large gains by 2002.
11 The states with prior accountability experienced a
drop in achievement from 2002 to 2003, both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to trend. The other group experienced very little increase from 2002 to
2005. Perhaps most important, however, visual inspection of the data in
these plots indicates that the earlier achievement trend was not linear,
which is a central assumption of the linear CITS model. Similarly, the
bottom right panel of the ﬁgure provides no evidence of an NCLB effect
on eighth-grade reading achievement.
ESTIMATION STRATEGY. Perhaps the most straightforward approach to
estimating the impact of NCLB in the framework described above is a
simple difference-in-differences framework in which one compares the
achievement levels of treatment and control states before and after the
introduction of NCLB. However, a fundamental assumption of this model
is that any preexisting trends in the outcome variables are equivalent
across treatment and control groups. Figure 4 clearly showed that the con-
trol states (those that implemented consequential accountability before
NCLB) realized more rapid improvements during the pre-NCLB period.
For this reason we estimate a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation that allows for
preexisting trends to differ across groups. Our model is the following:
where Yst is a measure of student achievement for state s in year t, YEARt is
a trend variable (deﬁned as the year of the test minus 1989 so that it starts
with a value of 1 in 1990), and NCLBt is a dummy variable equal to 1 for
observations starting in the academic year 2002–03. YR_SINCE_NCLBt is
defined as the year of the test minus 2002, so that this variable takes on
a value of 1 for the 2002–03 year, which corresponds to the 2003 NAEP
testing. Xst represents a vector of state × year covariates. In the main
() _ _ 1 01 2 3 Y YEAR NCLB YR SINCE NCLB st t t t =+ + + ( ββ β β ) )
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11. The graph is scaled to accentuate what are really quite small absolute changes from
year to year.
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square of students who were tested but excluded from ofﬁcial reporting
because of limited English proﬁciency or some type of learning disability.
The variables µs and st represent state ﬁxed effects and a mean-zero ran-
dom error, respectively.
Ts is a time-invariant variable that measures the treatment imposed by
NCLB. In the most basic setup, Ts could be speciﬁed as a dummy variable,
with a value of 1 indicating that a given state did not institute consequen-
tial accountability before NCLB. This is the approach implicitly taken in
ﬁgure 4. However, it is more accurate to view the “treatment” provided by
the introduction of NCLB in the framework of a dosage model. Slightly
more than half of the states that introduced consequential school account-
ability before NCLB did so within the 4 years before NCLB’s implemen-
tation. The simple binary deﬁnition of Ts above could lead to attenuated
estimates of the NCLB effect, because the control group would include
some states for which the effects of prior state policies and NCLB are
closely intertwined.
For this reason we instead define Ts as the number of years during our
panel period that a state did not have school accountability. Speciﬁcally,
we define the treatment as the number of years without prior school
accountability between the 1991–92 academic year and the onset of
NCLB. Hence, states with no prior accountability have a value of 11. Illi-
nois, which implemented its policy during the 1992–93 school year, has a
value of 1; Texas has a value of 3, since its policy started in 1994–95; and
Vermont has a value of 8, since its program started in 1999–2000. Our
identiﬁcation strategy implies that the larger the value of this treatment
variable, the greater the potential impact of NCLB.
This regression speciﬁcation allows for an NCLB effect that can be
reﬂected in both a level shift in the coefﬁcient on the outcome variable (β5)
and a shift in the coefﬁcient on the achievement trend variable (β6), each of
which varies with treatment status, Ts. Speciﬁcations based on alternative
functional forms generate results similar to those based on this canonical
CITS design.
12 For the sake of parsimony, the impact estimate we report is
the effect of NCLB by 2007 for states with no prior accountability relative
to states that adopted school accountability in 1997 (the mean adoption
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12. For example, we get similar results when we allow for a separate NCLB “effect”
unique to each post-NCLB year. We also ﬁnd similar results when we measure treatment
status with multiple dummy variables, allowing the trend and shift variables to differ across
groups of states that were early, middle, or late adopters of pre-NCLB accountability.
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models we present standard errors clustered by state to account for serial
correlation and other forms of heteroskedasticity.
The primary threat to causal inference in our CITS design is the existence
of time-varying unobservable factors that are coincident with the introduc-
tion of NCLB, affect treatment and control states differently, and inde-
pendently affect student performance. One example is endogenous student
mobility, such as might occur if NCLB caused families to leave or return to
the public schools. Another problematic scenario would be one where either
the treatment or the control states recovered from the 2001 recession more
quickly. As discussed below, we examine the empirical relevance of these
concerns in several ways and ﬁnd no evidence that our ﬁndings are biased.
Other threats to the causal validity of this state-based research design are
closely linked to exactly how the NCLB impact estimates from equation 1
should be interpreted. For example, our estimates will capture the impact of
the accountability provisions of NCLB but not the effects of other NCLB pro-
visions such as Reading First or the “highly qualiﬁed teacher” provision,
which were unique nationwide. Second, under the maintained assumption
that NCLB was effectively irrelevant in states with prior consequential
accountability systems, our estimates will identify the effects of NCLB-
induced school accountability provisions for a particular subgroup of
states (those without prior accountability policies). To the extent that one
believes that those states expecting to gain the most from accountability poli-
cies adopted them before NCLB, the results we report would understate the
average treatment effects of school accountability. Similarly, our estimates
will also understate the general effects of school accountability if NCLB
ampliﬁed the effects of school accountability within the states that already
had it. An alternative concern is that the accountability systems within control
states may have been weakened as they were adjusted in response to NCLB.
To the extent this occurred, our CITS approach would instead overstate the
effects of NCLB. We suspect this concern is not empirically relevant because
the school reporting and performance sanctions occasioned by NCLB (such
as the possibility of school reconstitution or closure) were strong relative to
prior state accountability policies. There is also direct empirical evidence
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13. Speciﬁcally, the effect as of 2007 would be calculated as β5 +β 6(5) in the simple
case where Ts is binary, but as β5(6) +β 6(6 × 5) in our preferred speciﬁcation where Ts is
allowed to vary across states and the NCLB effect is identiﬁed relative to a state that imple-
mented school accountability in 1997. As a practical matter, both approaches generate sim-
ilar results (Dee and Jacob forthcoming, table 3).
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states with preexisting school accountability systems did not change their
proﬁciency thresholds after the onset of NCLB.
RESULTS. Table 1 presents estimates of regressions, based on equation 1,
of the impact of NCLB on student performance in mathematics and read-
ing. Overall, the results suggest that NCLB had uniformly positive effects
on math performance among elementary students, particularly fourth-
graders. The mean impact of 7.2 score points for fourth-grade math trans-
lates to an effect size of 0.23 standard deviation. The effects are even
larger toward the left of the ability distribution. These estimates suggest that
NCLB increased the proportion of fourth-graders reaching the basic level
on NAEP by 10 percentage points, or a 16 percent increase relative to the
control mean of 64 percent. Although the mean effects for eighth-graders are
not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels (a 0.10-standard-deviation
effect, with a p-value of 0.12), the effects at the bottom tail are stronger.
NCLB increased the fraction of eighth-graders reaching the basic level in
math by 5.9 percentage points (9 percent).
Although we ﬁnd that NCLB had larger impacts on the mathematics per-
formance of lower-achieving students, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that the
introduction of NCLB harmed students at higher points on the achievement
distribution. In contrast to some prior work within individual districts and
states, we ﬁnd that NCLB seems to have increased achievement at higher
points on the achievement distribution more than one might have expected.
For example, in fourth-grade math the impacts at the 75th percentile were
only 3 scale points lower than those at the 10th percentile.
In contrast to the mathematics results, we do not ﬁnd consistent evidence
that NCLB inﬂuenced student achievement in reading. The NCLB impact
estimates for the reading measures are smaller and, in most cases, statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The one notable exception is the ﬁnding that
NCLB improved the reading performance of higher-achieving fourth-graders
(those at the 75th and the 90th percentiles) modestly but signiﬁcantly. How-
ever, as noted earlier, a caveat to the reading results is the suggestive evi-
dence that the pre-NCLB trends in reading achievement, which are noisy
and nonlinear, poorly match the assumptions of the CITS design. Further-
more, the capacity of this research design to detect effects on the reading
achievement of eighth-graders is attenuated by the fact that only 2 years of
pre-NCLB NAEP data are available for this grade-subject combination.
To test the sensitivity of our results to some of the potentially time-
varying unobservable factors described above, we conducted a series of
falsiﬁcation exercises in which we reestimated equation 1 with a variety of
168 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 169alternative outcome measures, including state-year poverty rates, median
household income, employment-population ratios, and the fraction of stu-
dents in the public schools. Across 40 regressions (10 models for each of
the four grade × subject combinations), we ﬁnd only one estimate signiﬁ-
cant at the 5 percent level and three estimates signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level. These largely null ﬁndings suggest that the assumptions required for
identiﬁcation are indeed met. In Dee and Jacob (forthcoming), we also
show that the results presented in table 1 are robust to a host of alternative
speciﬁcations, including the inclusion of a variety of state-year covariates,
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Table 2. Regressions Estimating the Effect of NCLB on Fourth- and Eighth-Grade NAEP 
Mathematics Scores, by Ethnicity and Eligibility for Free School Lunch Programa
Whites Blacks
Mean pre-NCLB  Mean pre-NCLB 
outcome in states outcome in states
Estimated without prior  Estimated without prior 
Dependent variable effect accountability effect accountability
Fourth-graders
Mean NAEP score
OLS 5.953** 232 4.582 203
(1.990) (5.436)
WLS 5.074** 233 15.378** 202
(2.159) (3.710)
Percent of pupils achieving 
at or above basic level
OLS 7.278** 76 8.431 35
(3.016) (6.693)




OLS 2.863 281 9.261 241
(2.561) (6.774)
WLS 1.828 282 8.826 242
(3.680) (8.999)
Percent of pupils achieving 
at or above basic level
OLS 4.740* 74 9.977 28
(2.639) (7.886)
WLS 4.253 76 10.004 28
(3.134) (11.955)
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Each reported coefﬁcient is from a separate regression and estimates the effect of NCLB as of 2007. 
See table 1 and the text for details. OLS = ordinary least squares; WLS = weighted least squares (weighting 
by student enrollment). Standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical 
signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, or *10 percent level.
12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 170the inclusion of state-speciﬁc time trends, the inclusion of a full set of year
ﬁxed effects, and weighting the data by the number of students enrolled in
that state and year.
14 Moreover, the inclusion of 2009 NAEP data does
not change the basic pattern of results presented here.
Table 2 reports regression estimates separately by subgroup, both
unweighted and weighted by student enrollment. Interestingly, the positive
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Hispanics Eligible for free school lunch Not eligible for free school lunch
Mean pre-NCLB  Mean pre-NCLB  Mean pre-NCLB 
outcome in states outcome in states outcome in states
Estimated without prior  Estimated without prior  Estimated without prior 
effect accountability effect accountability effect accountability
12.409** 204 6.934* 212 3.916 232
(4.540) (3.604) (3.102)
11.625** 204 9.734** 212 2.603 234
(1.572) (2.836) (2.907)
12.499* 40 11.186* 49 5.388 76
(6.334) (5.769) (4.435)
25.883** 36 17.256** 49 6.832** 78
(2.779) (4.986) (3.118)
20.031** 246 10.702* 257 2.199 279
(5.766) (6.155) (3.924)
8.219** 247 15.761** 256 0.992 281
(4.135) (5.631) (4.171)
22.006** 36 12.773* 47 3.152 72
(4.618) (7.328) (4.045)
18.692** 36 23.432** 46 2.392 74
(4.666) (6.398) (3.478)
14. Dee and Jacob (forthcoming) show that these results are also robust to measuring
the intensity of the treatment imposed by NCLB in terms of the stringency of the proﬁ-
ciency standards imposed by the state. Wong, Cook, and Steiner (2009) ﬁnd this as well.
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dents. For example, among fourth-graders, NCLB increased the math
achievement of black and Hispanic students. Interestingly, the enrollment-
weighted estimates are systematically larger than the unweighted esti-
mates for low-income and black students. For example, the weighted
estimate for African-American students is 15.4 points (roughly 0.5 stan-
dard deviation) compared with the unweighted estimate of 4.6 points.
Taken at face value, this suggests an important source of treatment-effect
heterogeneity, namely, that NCLB had a more positive effect on disadvan-
taged students in states with a greater number of such children (for exam-
ple, NCLB was more effective for black students in Alabama than for
black students in South Dakota). However, given the relatively small
number of treatment states with large populations of black students, the
possibility that this heterogeneity reflects other state-specific traits can-
not be discounted. The effect of NCLB on Hispanic students was also quite
large (roughly 12 points) and did not vary with weighting. The weighted
impact on students eligible for subsidized lunches was 9.7 points (roughly
0.3 standard deviation).
II.E. Evidence from Public- and Private-School Comparisons
The above comparison of trends in student performance within states
over time suggests that NCLB had a substantial impact on math achieve-
ment, particularly among disadvantaged students in fourth grade. As with
any nonexperimental design, however, the ﬁndings rest on assumptions
that cannot be fully tested. For this reason we present results from a com-
plementary analysis that makes use of an alternative control group.
In this approach we assess the impact of NCLB by comparing trends
over time in student performance in public versus Catholic schools.
15 Stu-
dents in private schools are eligible to participate in a number of major
programs under the ESEA, and NCLB’s reauthorization of ESEA left these
prior provisions largely intact (U.S. Department of Education 2007),
implying that the NCLB reforms were comparatively irrelevant for private
schools. The use of Catholic schools in this analysis improves upon interna-
tional comparisons by providing a within-nation control group. However,
as with the national and international time-series evidence, this approach
172 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
15. In earlier work (Dee and Jacob forthcoming) we identify several potential concerns
with using Catholic schools to identify the impact of NCLB.
12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 172also conflates the effects of NCLB across states and schools where its
impact was heterogeneous.
Figure 5, which follows the same structure as figure 4 in comparing
treatment and control states, shows pre- and post-NCLB achievement
trends across public and Catholic schools. Although the performance of
both public and Catholic students trended upward during the sample period,
the latter consistently outperformed their public-school counterparts. How-
ever, following the implementation of NCLB, the math performance of
public-school students converged somewhat toward that in the Catholic
schools and entered a period of somewhat stronger trend growth. This
comparative convergence is particularly pronounced for fourth-graders and
is consistent with the other time-series evidence suggesting that NCLB
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Figure 5. Mean Scaled Scores on the Main NAEP in Public and Catholic Schools,
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12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 173improved math achievement, particularly among younger students. The
reading achievement trends of eighth-graders are quite similar across
public and Catholic schools, suggesting the absence of a meaningful NCLB
impact. However, the reading achievement of public-school fourth-graders
trended upward during the NCLB era, particularly relative to that of
Catholic-school fourth-graders, which began a distinctive downward trend
during the NCLB era.
These public-Catholic comparisons are broadly consistent with the
state-based comparisons, suggesting that NCLB led to substantial gains in
the mathematics achievement of fourth-graders and possibly of eighth-
graders as well. These particular cross-sector comparisons also suggest
that NCLB increased the reading achievement of fourth-graders. A recent
study by Manyee Wong, Thomas Cook, and Peter Steiner (2009) includes
regression estimates based on public-Catholic comparisons of this sort and
draws similar conclusions. They also ﬁnd similar, although less precisely
estimated, results in comparisons of public schools and non-Catholic pri-
vate schools.
II.F. Summary of Achievement Effects
Given the national scope of the policy, assessing the causal impact of
NCLB on student performance is not straightforward. However, the body
of evidence presented above seems to suggest that the federal school
accountability policy did improve the math achievement of elementary
students, particularly among socioeconomically disadvantaged groups.
Comparable evidence that NCLB generated meaningful improvements
in reading achievement is lacking, however. Moreover, the analysis pre-
sented above focuses exclusively on elementary schools. NCLB also
requires AYP determinations for high schools, but here relatively little is
known about NCLB’s effects, in part because of data limitations: for exam-
ple, no state-level data for secondary-school math achievement on the
main NAEP are available after 2000.
What is the relevance for policy of the overall gains in math achieve-
ment that NCLB appears to have brought about? One way to benchmark a
7.2-point (0.23-standard-deviation) gain in fourth-grade math achievement
is to compare this effect with achievement gaps that are of interest. For
example, a test-score gain of this size is equivalent to approximately 24 per-
cent of the black-white test-score gap observed in the 2000 NAEP data.
Furthermore, because NCLB appears to have been more effective among
disadvantaged subgroups, it may have contributed to closing some achieve-
ment gaps. For example, the effect of NCLB on the math achievement of
174 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
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effects on white students, implying that NCLB closed the white-Hispanic
achievement gap by 19 percent.
III. Impact of NCLB on the Organization and Practice 
of Education
Given the encouraging effects on math achievement and the somewhat
puzzling lack of effects for reading, it is natural to ask how NCLB affected
the organization and practice of elementary education across the coun-
try. Such evidence on potential mediating mechanisms could not only
guide revisions to the NCLB legislation, but also shed light on the edu-
cation production function in ways that would inform other school
reforms. To provide some coherence to the discussion that follows, we
group nonachievement outcomes from a variety of sources into several
broad categories: changes in educational resources, changes in instruc-
tional focus or methods or both, and changes in school organization, cli-
mate, or culture.
III.A. Impact on Education Expenditure
The direct costs of managing an accountability system are quite small
on a per-pupil basis (Hoxby 2002). However, standards-based reforms
have often been presented to the public as a trade: greater resources and
ﬂexibility for educators in exchange for greater accountability. One of the
most strident criticisms of NCLB is that it failed to deliver on this bargain.
However, there is surprisingly little research on the relationship between
school accountability and spending, despite an extensive literature on edu-
cation ﬁnance more generally.
One notable exception is an analysis of district-level expenditure data
from 1991–92 to 1996–97 by Jane Hannaway, Shannon McKay, and
Yasser Nakib (2002). Examining four states that implemented compre-
hensive accountability programs in the 1990s—Kentucky, Maryland,
North Carolina, and Texas—they ﬁnd that only two (Texas and Kentucky)
increased educational expenditure more than the national average (but
those two did so substantially). Hannaway and Maggie Stanislawski (2005)
present evidence that the major pre-NCLB accountability reforms in Florida
were associated with increased expenditure for instructional staff support
and professional development, particularly in low-performing schools. Of
course, it is difﬁcult to determine whether the accountability policy caused
the increased expenditure or whether both were merely parts of a broader
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12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 17516. Also as before, the ﬁgures omit states that adopted school accountability programs
between 1999 and 2001, because the impacts of these state programs might be confounded
with the introduction of NCLB in 2002. In the regression estimates discussed below, how-
ever, we include all states.
reform agenda. Overall, the extant literature offers at best suggestive evi-
dence on how accountability reforms may have inﬂuenced school spending.
To provide new evidence on how NCLB influenced local school
ﬁnances, we pooled annual, district-level data on revenue and expenditure
from U.S. Census surveys of school district ﬁnances (the F-33 Annual Sur-
vey of Local Government Finances) over the period from 1994 to 2008
(Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010). Our analytical sample consists of all
operational, uniﬁed school districts nationwide (roughly 10,000) for each
survey year. To identify the effects of NCLB accountability on district
ﬁnances, we utilize the same cross-state trend analysis described above,
comparing within-state changes in school ﬁnance measures across states
with and without pre-NCLB accountability programs.
Figure 6 shows trends in district expenditure over time separately for
states that adopted consequential accountability before NCLB and those
that did not. All results are reported in 2009 dollars and are weighted by
district enrollment. As in the earlier ﬁgures, the trend lines are ﬁtted linear
regression lines.
16 The top left panel of ﬁgure 6 shows that total per-pupil
expenditure rose more quickly from 1994 to 2002 in states that adopted
pre-NCLB accountability policies. But following the introduction of
NCLB, spending grew more slowly in these early-adopting states, suggest-
ing that NCLB increased expenditure. The top right and bottom left panels
of the ﬁgure show comparable results for the two largest categories of total
expenditure, instructional and support service spending.
Table 3 presents regression estimates based on the model in equation 1,
with the inclusion of the following district-year controls: enrollment,
enrollment squared, the fraction of the student population that is black or
Hispanic, the poverty rate (based on 2000 census data), the poverty rate
squared, and the interaction between the poverty rate and the fraction black
or Hispanic. As in earlier models, we present standard errors clustered by
state. We report estimates of the impact of NCLB as of 2008 for states that
did not have consequential accountability before NCLB relative to states
that adopted consequential accountability in 1997.
The results indicate that NCLB increased total current expenditure by
$570 per pupil, or by 6.8 percent from the 1999–2000 mean of $8,360. The
increased expenditure was allocated to direct instruction and support ser-
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Common Core of Data’s Local Education Agency 
(School District) Finance Survey.
a. All data are for elementary and secondary school expenditure. Sample is composed of all noncharter, 
unifed local education agency school districts, excluding Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and 
zero-enrollment districts. Estimates are weighted by district enrollment. Treatment and control states are 
defined as in figure 4.
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Figure 6. Expenditure per Pupil by Timing of Increased School Accountability,
1995–2008
a
vices in proportions roughly equivalent to average spending patterns, with
effects of $430 (8.3 percent) and $155 (5.6 percent), respectively. Results
presented in the bottom two rows of the table reveal that the increased
expenditure was not matched by corresponding increases in federal sup-
port, consistent with allegations that NCLB constitutes an unfunded
mandate. (However, the increase in spending on student support is not
statistically significant at conventional levels.) In results not shown here,
we ﬁnd that the effects were fairly similar across districts with different
baseline levels of student poverty, suggesting that NCLB did not meaning-
fully inﬂuence distributional equity. Moreover, in results reported else-
where, we demonstrate that these ﬁndings are robust to the same falsiﬁcation
12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 177exercises and alternative speciﬁcations described earlier for the achieve-
ment analysis (Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010).
17
In light of the achievement effects discussed in the previous section, a
natural and policy-relevant question is to ask how the monetized bene-
fits of those test-score gains compare with the corresponding expenditure
increases presented here. On the basis of prior estimates that a 1-standard-
deviation increase in elementary math scores is associated with an 8 percent
increase in adult earnings (Krueger 2003), the 0.23-standard-deviation
impact of NCLB would translate into a lifetime earnings boost of 1.8 per-
cent. Assuming a 3 percent discount rate, the present discounted value as
of age 9 of such an increase beginning at age 18 is at least $13,300.
18
Hence, even if we assume that the increased expenditure due to NCLB is
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17. As discussed in related work, we do not ﬁnd substantial impacts on class size, sug-
gesting that the increase in instructional expenditure due to NCLB may have been allocated
to other functions (Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010).
18. This calculation uses an age-earnings proﬁle of 18- to 65-year-olds taken from the
March 2007 Current Population Survey. Allowing for reasonable productivity-related
growth in earnings of 2 percent a year increases the monetized beneﬁt of the test-score
gains due to NCLB to roughly $25,500.
Table 3. Regressions Estimating Effects of NCLB on Education Expenditure by
Function and Revenue by Source
Constant (2009) dollars per pupil
Mean for 1999–2000  Estimated impact 
Dependent variable school year of NCLBa
Expenditure
Total current expenditure, K-12 8,360 570**
Instructional (2,061) (237)
5,209 430***








State and local 9,155 448
(2,250) (288)
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Each reported coefﬁcient is from a separate regression, based on roughly 140,000 district-year
observations, that identiﬁes the effect of NCLB as of 2008. See table 1 and the text for details. Standard
deviations or standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁ-
cance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, or *10 percent level.
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the corresponding test-score gains are at least twice as large. It should be
stressed, however, that this exercise turns on multiple unstated assump-
tions. In particular, this back-of-the-envelope calculation ignores cer-
tain socially relevant benefits (such as the externalities of human capital
improvements) and costs (such as the deadweight losses associated with
raising government revenue to pay for the added spending). More generally,
it is not clear that these expenditure increases were even a relevant mediating
mechanism behind NCLB’s achievement effects. Nonetheless, this calcula-
tion provides suggestive evidence that the achievement gains attributable to
NCLB may compare favorably with the corresponding spending increases.
III.B. Impact on Teachers and Classrooms
One of the most prominent issues raised by NCLB concerns the intended
and unintended ways in which it may have inﬂuenced classroom practice.
In particular, test-based accountability policy creates a strong incentive for
educators to focus on tested content and skills. Indeed, according to many,
this is precisely the point of the reform. But at the same time, critics have
worried that such incentives may cause schools to neglect important but
nontested subjects, or to change instructional practice in a way that pri-
oritizes narrow test preparation over broader learning. In this section we
discuss the available evidence on how school accountability programs,
including NCLB, inﬂuence classroom instruction.
The most consistent and compelling finding with regard to school
accountability and classroom instruction involves the allocation of instruc-
tional time. A number of studies have documented that test-based account-
ability programs cause educators to reallocate instructional time toward
tested subjects, to reallocate time within tested subjects toward speciﬁc
content and skills covered on the exam, and to increase time devoted to nar-
row test preparation activities that may have little broader value (Hannaway
and Hamilton 2008).
In 2001, for example, researchers at the National Board on Educational
Testing and Public Policy surveyed a nationally representative sample of
teachers, asking them a series of questions about how state-mandated test-
ing programs inﬂuenced their practice (Pedulla and others 2003). Teachers
in states where the exam results were used to hold teachers or schools
accountable reported shifting instruction toward tested subjects more than
did teachers in states where the exam results were used primarily for infor-
mational purposes. For example, 34 percent of teachers working in high-
stakes testing regimes, but only 17 percent of teachers in moderate-stakes
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time spent in tested areas “a great deal.” In addition, teachers in states with
school accountability programs reported spending more time on a variety
of activities designed to improve student test-taking skills, such as taking
practice tests (Pedulla and others 2003). In states where the tests had
important consequences for the schools, roughly 36 percent of elementary
teachers reported spending more than 30 hours per year on test preparation
activities, compared with only 12 percent of teachers in states where tests
had few consequences for schools.
19
Recent studies that focus on NCLB itself ﬁnd similar results. In 2005, for
example, researchers at the RAND Corporation collected data from teach-
ers, principals, and superintendents in three states (California, Georgia, and
Pennsylvania) to examine how they were responding to the introduction
of NCLB (Hamilton and others 2007). Educators reported a narrowing of
the curriculum and an emphasis on test preparation, particularly for “bub-
ble kids” near the proﬁciency cut score for their state assessment system.
In addition, educators responded to NCLB by increasing the alignment
between the curriculum and state standards.
Studies of earlier school accountability programs found a similar
increase in alignment. The programs led teachers to shift the content of their
instruction within subjects (Stecher and others 1998, Koretz and others
1996, Jacob 2005, Koretz and Hamilton 2006). This literature emphasizes
that the format and structure of the test itself can inﬂuence instruction. For
example, Grace Taylor and others (2003) ﬁnd that testing programs with
short, open-ended items lead teachers to focus greater attention on problem-
solving skills.
The Center on Education Policy (CEP) has studied the implementation
and impact of NCLB since its inception (CEP 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008b).
As part of its work, CEP not only surveyed a nationally representative
sample of school districts in 2005–06 and again in 2006–07, but also con-
ducted more intensive case studies of selected school districts. District
ofﬁcials report that NCLB led them to increase the instructional time their
schools devote to math or English language arts (ELA) or both. About
62 percent of districts reported that between 2001–02 and 2006–07 they
increased instruction in these subjects in elementary schools, with the
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19. Ladd and Zelli (2002) found similar results in a survey study of school principals in
North Carolina during the period when the state was introducing its school accountability
program. Principals reported devoting more resources to the high-stakes subjects of math,
reading, and writing.
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(CEP 2007) and in urban and high-poverty districts (CEP 2006). More-
over, the reallocation reported by ofﬁcials appears substantial. For exam-
ple, 80 percent of districts that reported increasing ELA time did so by at
least 75 minutes per week, and 54 percent reported doing so by at least
150 minutes per week (CEP 2008). Most districts that reported increased
time for ELA or math reported cuts in time for other subjects or periods
(such as social studies, art, music, gym, recess, or lunch) rather than
increases in total time in school (CEP 2008).
20
The CEP studies also suggest that NCLB inﬂuenced classroom practice
in ways that may have attenuated teacher autonomy. For example, CEP
(2006, 2007) reports that schools made a concentrated effort to align their
curriculum with state standards in the wake of NCLB, thus changing the
focus of their curriculum to put greater emphasis on tested content and
skills. Many districts also became more prescriptive during this period
about what and how teachers were supposed to teach (CEP 2006).
It is worth noting that the costs and beneﬁts of these instructional
changes depend on one’s objectives and are not always clear even for a
given objective. For example, many observers applaud the increasing
emphasis on math and reading instruction, while others lament the decreas-
ing attention on subjects such as art and music (Rothstein and others 2008).
Although these studies paint a consistent picture, they need to be
interpreted with some caution. All of the research described thus far
relies on self-reports from teachers or administrators. Moreover, the
information is based on questions that ask respondents to retrospectively
assess whether certain practices have changed over time. For this reason,
one might be worried about the reliability and validity of the data (Bradburn
and Sudman 1988).
Few studies have implemented regression-based research designs that
attempt to isolate the effects of school accountability policies on district,
school, and classroom practices from the potentially confounding effects of
other determinants. One prominent exception is a recent study by Cecilia
Elena Rouse and others (2007), which used a regression-discontinuity
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20. A 2009 Government Accountability Ofﬁce study based on teacher survey data (and
supplemental interviews with state ofﬁcials) ﬁnds that 90 percent of elementary teachers
reported no change in instructional time for arts education between 2004–05 and 2006–07.
At the same time, a larger fraction of teachers in schools identiﬁed as needing improvement
under NCLB reported a decline in art instruction, relative to teachers in other schools. This
study used data from the Department of Education’s National Longitudinal Study of No
Child Left Behind (NLS-NCLB).
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schools responded to pressure from the state’s accountability system. They
ﬁnd that accountability pressure leads to an increased emphasis on low-
performing students (through grade retention, summer school, and tutoring,
for example), increased overall instructional time, and reorganized school
days. They also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that accountability reduced prin-
cipal control and increased the resources available to teachers. Further-
more, the school policies influenced by school accountability explain a
meaningful fraction of student test-score gains, suggesting that schools
responded to accountability pressure in speciﬁc ways that improved stu-
dent achievement.
Although the work just summarized addresses some of the concerns
raised in previous work, it has its own set of limitations. It does not address
NCLB per se, and it estimates what one might describe as the partial
impact of the Florida accountability system, comparing schools more or
less affected by accountability pressure. However, it is possible that the
accountability system in Florida, or NCLB more generally, led to changes
across all schools.
In recent work we present new evidence on these issues using data from
the nationally representative Schools and Stafﬁng Survey (SASS) and the
state-based CITS research design (Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010). The
SASS is a nationally representative survey of teachers and school adminis-
trators that has been conducted periodically since the early 1990s (in 1994,
2000, 2004, and 2008).
21 We use teacher responses from the survey to con-
struct a variety of measures of classroom instruction and school organiza-
tion. These data allow us to compare changes in teacher responses over
time rather than rely on the teachers’ retrospective judgments. They also
provide more objective measures of some of the constructs: for example,
the time-use questions ask about the actual number of hours per week a
teacher devotes to math, rather than asking teachers to characterize their
emphasis on math as “big” or “small” or whether it is greater or less than it
was a certain number of years ago.
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21. Because the pooled SASS data contain data from only two pre-NCLB periods, Dee,
Jacob, and Schwartz (2010) also examined the robustness of the SASS-based models to the
use of conventional difference-in-differences speciﬁcations. The results were quite similar
to the CITS results, with the modest exception of one result discussed below. That paper
also presents falsiﬁcation exercises similar to those presented for the NAEP and F-33 mod-
els, the results of which generally suggest that the CITS speciﬁcation based on the SASS
data generates internally valid estimates.
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teacher compensation by year across treatment and control states. As in
the previous figures, we show the trends separately for states that did
and did not adopt school accountability programs before NCLB. These
district-level data indicate that, after the introduction of NCLB, average
annual teacher compensation increased distinctly, from roughly $75,000
to over $80,000, in states that did not have prior school accountability.
However, this graph also suggests an NCLB effect: this compensation
growth was particularly large relative to the corresponding changes in
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Common Core of Data (top panels) and the Schools
and Staffing Survey (bottom panels).
a. Sample is composed of all noncharter, unifed local education agency school districts, excluding
Hawaii, the District of Columbia, and zero-enrollment districts. Estimates are weighted by district
enrollment. Teacher compensation includes the value of noncash employee benefits.
b. Treatment and control states are defined as in figure 4.
c. Sample consists of full-time elementary- and middle-school teachers with a main assignment in
mathematics, English language arts, or general elementary instruction.
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Figure 7. School Resources by Timing of Increased School Accountability, 1994–2008
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right panel of figure 7 shows changes over time in the fraction of ele-
mentary- and middle-school teachers with a master’s degree (based on
the pooled SASS data) and similarly suggests an NCLB effect. In states
with prior accountability programs, roughly 47 percent of teachers had 
a master’s degree in 1994, compared with 37 percent of teachers in other
states. Following the introduction of NCLB, the fraction of teachers with
a master’s degree jumped notably in states without prior accountability, so
that in 2004 the rates were approximately equal across both groups of
states. By 2008, teachers in states without prior accountability were
slightly more likely to have a master’s degree than their counterparts in
other states. In contrast, the top right and bottom left panels of figure 7
provide no clear indication that NCLB influenced class sizes or pupil-
teacher ratios, respectively (see also Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010).
Table 4 presents regression estimates of these effects based on the CITS
model in equation 1, adding a variety of controls for teacher, school, and
district observed traits (Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz 2010). As above, stan-
dard errors are clustered by state. The results indicate that NCLB increased
average teacher compensation by over $5,000, or by roughly 8 percent rel-
ative to the pre-NCLB mean of $79,577. The table also indicates that by
2008, NCLB had increased the fraction of teachers with a master’s degree
by roughly 0.056, from a baseline of 0.41, an increase of roughly 14 per-
cent. Given that many districts require teachers to have a master’s degree
for permanent certiﬁcation, it is possible that this effect reﬂects the
response of states to the NCLB provision requiring schools to have
“highly qualiﬁed” teachers in every classroom. The fact that states with
prior accountability policies also had a substantially larger fraction of
teachers with a master’s degree suggests that programs adopted by states
before NCLB may have contained some provisions regarding teacher
qualiﬁcations.
The top right and bottom left panels of figure 8 show trends in time
use for our sample of elementary-school teachers and principals for states
that did and those that did not adopt school accountability programs
before NCLB. The top right panel shows the amount of instructional
time (in hours per week) that teachers report for core academic subjects.
The bottom left panel shows the fraction of time during the week that
self-contained teachers (those who provide instruction in multiple sub-
jects to a single group of students) teach math and ELA, where the
denominator is total time spent on the four core subjects (math, ELA,
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social studies, and science). The bottom right panel of the figure shows
this ratio for ELA alone.
These ﬁgures suggest that NCLB did not lead to meaningful increases
in the total amount of instructional time devoted to core subjects, but
that instructional time allocated to math and ELA increased following the
introduction of NCLB. Moreover, the effects seem to be larger in states
that had not previously instituted school accountability, consistent with
NCLB leading to this change.
Table 4. Estimated Effects of NCLB on School Resources, Allocation of Instructional
Time, and Educational Climate
Mean for  Estimated 
1999–2000 impact of 








Class size 22.120 −0.328
(4.990) (0.500)
Fraction of teachers with master’s degree 0.412 0.056**
(0.492) (0.028)
Instructional time
Hours per week spent on core academic subjects
c 21.758 −0.307
(6.445) (0.684)
Fraction of total hours spent on math and English 0.737 0.036***
(0.130) (0.012)
Fraction of total hours spent on English 0.476 0.023*
(0.156) (0.013)
Educational climate
Fraction of schools where principal places highest priority 0.875 −0.003
on academic excellence or basic skill acquisition (0.331) (0.037)
Teachers’ perceptions of school discipline −0.003 0.074
(0.989) (0.115)
Teachers’ perceptions of student engagement 0.059 0.220***
(0.990) (0.056)
Source: Authors’ regressions.
a. Each reported coefﬁcient is from a separate regression and identiﬁes the effect of NCLB as of 2008.
See table 1 and the text for details. Except where noted otherwise, estimates use pooled data from the
Schools and Stafﬁng Survey. Standard deviations or standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, or *10 percent level.
b. Estimates use data from the Common Core of Data’s Local Education Agency (School District)
Finance Survey from the National Center for Education Statistics. Teacher compensation includes the
value of noncash employee beneﬁts.
c. Mathematics, English language arts, social studies, and science.
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey.
a. Departmentalized teachers (those who instruct several classes of different students, usually in the 
same subject) as a share of all (departmentalized, self-contained, and team) teachers.
b. Time devoted to mathematics, English language arts, social studies, and science.
c. Sample consists of classes taught by self-contained and team teachers only. 
d. Treatment and control states are defined as in figure 4.
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Figure 8. School Allocation of Time, by Timing of Increased School Accountability,
1994–2008
Estimates reported in the middle panel of table 4 indicate that NCLB
increased the fraction of time that teachers spend on math and ELA by
3.6 percentage points, relative to a baseline of 74 percent. This implies an
additional 45 minutes per week of math and ELA instruction by teachers
who spend 20 instructional hours on these two subjects. It appears that
this increase was driven primarily by an increase in time devoted to
ELA: table 4 indicates that NCLB increased the share of instructional
time devoted to ELA by a weakly significant 2.3 percentage points. In
contrast, we do not find that NCLB had statistically significant effects
12367-03a_Dee_rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:06 AM  Page 186on the fraction of time devoted to math. This is particularly interesting
given that we find substantial achievement effects in math but not in
reading.
III.C. Impacts on School Organization, Climate, and Culture
The literature provides some evidence that test-based accountability
policies, including NCLB, have spurred other useful changes in school-
wide instructional practice. In the RAND study cited above (Hamilton and
others 2007), for example, school and district administrators reported that
NCLB increased the use of diagnostic assessment (exams used by teachers
to determine a student’s areas of strength and weakness) as an instructional
tool and increased the technical assistance and professional development
opportunities offered to schools. In earlier survey work, researchers found
that teachers in high-stakes environments found test results more useful,
and were more likely to use test information to inform their practice, than
colleagues in low-stakes environments (Pedulla and others 2003). Simi-
larly, teachers in the RAND study reported that their state’s accountability
system under NCLB led them to search for more effective teaching prac-
tices and, in nearly all cases, had led to positive changes in their schools
(Hamilton and others 2007). Interestingly, for example, teachers reported
that teaching practices and the general focus on student learning “changed
for the better” under accountability. District ofﬁcials in the CEP study
reported an increase in the use of data to guide instruction (CEP 2006).
Unfortunately, the SASS has not routinely collected data on many of
the school and teacher practices that are of interest, and this limits our
capacity to isolate the effects of NCLB on some of these outcomes. How-
ever, the SASS has collected consistent data on several relevant school-
level traits. For example, the principals who responded to the SASS were
asked to choose their top three priorities from a list of nine educational
goals. The top panel of figure 9 shows the comparative trend data for 
the share of principals who indicated that either academic excellence or
acquisition of basic skills was their top goal. States with and without prior
accountability did not converge on this measure of instructional focus
after NCLB. This pattern suggests that NCLB did not generate a detectable
increase in instructional focus, a result conﬁrmed by the regression results
in table 4.
Teachers surveyed in the SASS provided scaled responses to questions
about whether principals and fellow teachers enforced rules for student
conduct. The middle panel of the ﬁgure shows the comparative trends for
the standardized responses to this question and suggests the lack of an
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Source: Authors’ calculations using data from the Schools and Staffing Survey.
a. Sample is limited to full-time elementary- and middle-school principals.
b. Treatment and control states are defined as in figure 4.
c. Sample is defined as in figure 7.
d. Higher scores indicate greater enforcement of rules or greater engagement.
Percent of schools
Principals place highest priority on academic excellence or basic skill acquisitiona
Standardized composite scored

























Teachers’ perception of student engagementc
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Figure 9. School Culture Outcomes by Timing of Increased School Accountability,
1994–2008
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shows the trend data for a standardized measure of how teachers viewed
their students’ school-relevant behavior and attitudes. This measure, an
index of “behavioral engagement” with school, standardized to have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1, reflects the extent to which
teachers feel that traits such as tardiness, absenteeism, and apathy are not a
problem within their school. Here there seems to have been comparative
improvement in this measure of student engagement for states that intro-
duced school accountability because of NCLB. The regression results in
table 4 indicate that the size of this increase is 0.22 base-year (1994) stan-
dard deviation.
This estimated effect on student engagement is over twice as large in
high-poverty schools. However, Dee, Jacob, and Schwartz (2010) ﬁnd
that NCLB’s estimated effects on this engagement measure are noticeably
smaller (an effect size of 0.094) in a difference-in-differences specifica-
tion, which does not condition on pretreatment trends unique to treat-
ment status. We cannot definitively establish whether the CITS or the
difference-in-differences specifications generate more accurate point
estimates in this context. However, the differences in pre-NCLB student
engagement trends across treatment and control states depicted in ﬁgure 9
are consistent with the motivation for the CITS specification. A very
different caveat to this result is that NCLB’s apparent effect on teacher-
reported student engagement could simply be due to policy-induced
changes in teacher expectations. For example, to the extent that NCLB
increased the expectations for academic achievement in states without
prior school accountability policies, it is possible that teachers simulta-
neously chose to benchmark the behavioral engagement of their students
with school against a more lax standard. If this is true, our estimate of the
impact on behavioral engagement is biased upward.
III.D. Summary
The evidence presented above suggests that NCLB has had both desir-
able and undesirable effects on school district spending, teachers, class-
room practice, and school culture. Unfortunately, the lack of objective
measures for several important instructional practices limits our ability to
examine many of the most plausible mechanisms through which account-
ability may have operated to improve student achievement. Moreover, the
analysis here does not allow us to identify which, if any, of the factors we
identify as improving (for example, per-pupil spending, student engage-
ment, teacher qualiﬁcations, or instruction time devoted to English) might
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provides important evidence on the policy-relevant, nonachievement con-
sequences of NCLB (for example, its ﬁscal effects) as well as guideposts
to the intended and unintended ways in which NCLB has shaped the avail-
able measures of educational practice.
IV. Conclusions
Eight years have passed since No Child Left Behind dramatically expanded
the federal role in public schooling. Given the national scope of the policy,
it is difﬁcult to reach deﬁnitive conclusions about its impact. Nonetheless,
evidence from a variety of data sources utilizing several plausible compar-
ison groups suggests that NCLB has had a positive effect on elementary
student performance in mathematics, particularly at the lower grades. The
beneﬁts appear to be concentrated among traditionally disadvantaged pop-
ulations, with particularly large effects among Hispanic students. On the
other hand, the existing evidence suggests that NCLB has not had a com-
parable effect on reading performance.
We find compelling evidence that NCLB increased per-pupil school
district expenditure, particularly on direct instruction, a mediating mecha-
nism that may explain the corresponding achievement gains. By 2008, for
example, the policy appears to have increased annual spending per pupil by
nearly $600 in states that did not have any school accountability program
before NCLB; these increased outlays were not supported by correspond-
ing increases in federal revenue. We also presented evidence that these
expenditure increases may be modest relative to the present discounted
value of the corresponding test-score gains. We also discussed evidence
suggesting that NCLB inﬂuenced teachers and schools in several poten-
tially important ways. It appears that NCLB has led elementary schools to
increase instructional time devoted to math and reading, although the
majority of evidence on this point comes from teacher and administrator
survey data that are subject to potential bias. Similarly, teachers report that
NCLB has encouraged schools to spend time on narrow test preparation
activities. However, we also found evidence that NCLB led to increases in
teacher-reported measures of students’ behavioral engagement with school.
Unfortunately, a lack of a richly detailed dataset that lends itself to credible
identiﬁcation strategies makes it difﬁcult to assess whether NCLB inﬂu-
enced curriculum and instructional practices in more fundamental ways.
Nonetheless, the extant body of evidence can provide some guidance to
the ongoing debate over the proposed reauthorization of NCLB. In March
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lined proposed features of a reauthorization (Klein and McNeil 2010). This
proposal calls for continued annual reporting of school-level, test-based
student assessments but allows for ﬂexibility in how states calculate school
effectiveness. The blueprint also calls for the use of nontest accountabil-
ity indicators, especially measures of college and career readiness (such as
attendance, course completion, and school climate). Another potentially
critical feature of this proposal involves changing how measures of
school performance are linked to consequences.
The blueprint also proposes to give states increased flexibility in how
they might intervene in low-performing schools, mandating speciﬁc con-
sequences only for the very lowest-performing schools and those with per-
sistently large achievement gaps. It is not clear how states would respond
to this added flexibility. However, the literature on pre-NCLB account-
ability policies suggests that simply reporting accountability measures
that were unconnected to explicit consequences did not drive improve-
ments in student achievement (Hanushek and Raymond 2005). This
suggests that the targeted achievement gains attributable to NCLB could
be at risk under state reforms that decouple performance measures from
meaningful consequences.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
CAROLINE M. HOXBY Thomas Dee and Brian Jacob provide a review
of existing empirical studies on how No Child Left Behind (NCLB) has
affected student achievement. They also present original findings based
on a difference-in-differences comparison of states that implemented
school accountability only with NCLB and those that had implemented 
it previously. The difference-in-differences work relies on test scores
from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the only
examination regularly administered to samples of students representa-
tive of each state.
In their review of existing studies, Dee and Jacob concisely, yet accu-
rately, summarize the most credible research on NCLB and the state
accountability laws that preceded it. Much of the existing evidence is
lacking in rigor or partial in nature, and the authors do an excellent job
of differentiating between stronger and weaker results. However, Dee and
Jacob’s difference-in-differences work is the meat of their paper, and thus
these comments focus on it.
Of all the areas within education in which the federal government plays
a role, that in primary and secondary education is by far the most minor.
Whereas each of the states has a responsibility for education written into
its constitution and has a long history of ﬁnancing and overseeing educa-
tion, the federal government has traditionally conﬁned itself to funding a
small percentage of the education of poor and disabled students and those
with limited knowledge of English. At no time before the Obama adminis-
tration did the federal government account for more than 10 percent of
public spending on primary and secondary education, and it has no formal
role in the governance of any regular public school. Simply put, the federal
12367-03b_Dee comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:16 AM  Page 195government is a very junior partner in education policy; states and local
school districts occupy the driver’s seat.
This structure of ﬁnancing and control has two important implications
for all federal education policy. First, it is state governments and large
school districts that set the pace and frontier in education policy. Second,
the federal government has little ability to enforce its policy will: even
when federal law mandates some education policy, it is states and dis-
tricts that must implement it. And they are quite capable of implementing
only the letter of the law, and none of its intent. These two implications
are glaringly obvious in the history of NCLB.
Starting in the late 1980s, a number of states began to enact laws designed
to hold their schools accountable for overall student outcomes. They insti-
tuted mandatory statewide exams and published the results prominently
in the media and in “school report cards” sent to parents. They devised
grading systems for their schools, which gave better grades to schools with
higher test scores and graduation rates. The more sophisticated state grad-
ing systems incorporated value-added calculations for schools based on
test scores, regression adjustments for sociodemographics, and weights
on a variety of complex outcomes beyond scores. Schools that earned poor
grades experienced interventions, sometimes welcome and sometimes
not, from state departments of education. Chronically failing schools were
reconstituted by some states. The states that led the accountability move-
ment created powerful databases that allowed them to track students and
teachers longitudinally, certified teachers through nontraditional routes
(such as proﬁciency testing), rewarded teachers and schools they deemed
successful, and established very modest forms of school choice.
The accountability movement was led by an informal but like-minded
group of governors and chief state school officers, prominent among
whom were Governor George W. Bush of Texas and Governor Jeb Bush
of Florida. Both Bushes would later point to education accountability as their
main legacy to the states they governed. Thus, it should come as no surprise
that when NCLB was drafted as one of the ﬁrst major policies of the George
W. Bush presidency, the ﬁrst draft looked a lot like Texas’ and Florida’s
accountability policies. The ﬁnal version, however, was a very dilute law,
reﬂecting numerous political compromises and the federal government’s
negligible powers of enforcement.
NCLB was written in such a way that states antagonistic to school
accountability could easily evade every aspect of the law. For instance, by
choosing a test on which nearly all students did well from the start, a state
could ensure that all its schools met the proﬁciency standard and thereby
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choosing no statewide test at all.) A state could comply with NCLB’s
reporting provisions by putting its school report cards on an obscure
website with little or no functionality. Some websites deliberately pre-
vented parents and journalists from comparing schools’ reports. States
could ensure that all their teachers met the “highly qualified” mandates
of NCLB, which were meant to ensure subject area knowledge, simply by
setting standards that automatically made all their existing teachers “highly
qualiﬁed.” For instance, some states declared all teachers who were experi-
enced or certiﬁed to be highly qualiﬁed regardless of their proﬁciency or
area of teaching. Districts that wished to evade the (very modest) school
choice provisions of NCLB could refrain from notifying parents that their
children were eligible to transfer to another public school and from telling
parents that they could use their federal dollars for private tutoring services.
In short, NCLB was a peculiar law. It could have little effect on states
antagonistic to school accountability. Rather, it was a nudge to states that
supported accountability enough to welcome a nudge but not enough to have
enacted accountability before NCLB. States that had already adopted
pro-accountability measures viewed NCLB as a drag on their more ambi-
tious, more sophisticated policies. For instance, Jeb Bush’s Florida wrestled
with the U.S. Department of Education, trying to get waivers from the
federal school grading system, which was manifestly inferior to its own.
Several states, especially Massachusetts, argued that NCLB gave them
strong incentives to reduce the quality of their tests.
This is the backdrop to Dee and Jacob’s analysis, and it is one that
causes their difference-in-differences estimates to be quite unreliable.
Their estimates almost certainly understate the effects in which policy-
makers are interested. My logic on this has three different components.
First, Dee and Jacob’s “control” states did not hold their policies con-
stant, and so do not amount to true counterfactuals. Second, NCLB could
be expected to have heterogeneous treatment effects depending on a state’s
willingness to implement it, and the difference-in-differences analysis does
not account for this. Third, policymakers are interested in population-
average effects, which the difference-in-differences analysis substantially
understates. Let me take each of these in turn.
Dee and Jacob describe as “treated by NCLB” those states that had no
school accountability program before the 2001 law. Their “control” states
are those that had implemented their own accountability programs before
2001. Their difference-in-differences method identifies the effects of
NCLB by comparing the pre-versus-post-NCLB achievement change in
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states. There are a few more details to the equation they estimate, but this
comparison is the key to their identiﬁcation strategy.
In a credible difference-in-differences exercise, the control states must
reveal what would have occurred in the treated states had NCLB not been
enacted. This they do not do in the Dee and Jacob exercise. The control
states are the pro-accountability states that had already enacted more ambi-
tious programs than NCLB and that continued to extend and improve their
programs in the wake of its enactment. These states rolled out improved
school grading systems, estimated the value added of individual teachers,
and instituted rewards for individual students to excel (such as scholar-
ships) and remedies for students who did not (such as summer school and
grade retention). Many of the control states actually increased accountabil-
ity more in the immediate aftermath of NCLB than did the treated states.
Thus, the control states’ achievement reﬂects not only the lagged effects of
their pre-NCLB policies (since student achievement reacts gradually to
policy) but also the effects of their post-NCLB increases in accountability.
This makes the control states a very poor counterfactual for the treated
states, most of which would have enacted no or only weak accountability
programs had NCLB not existed. There is no guarantee that removing the
pre-NCLB trend in the achievement of control states, as Dee and Jacob do,
ﬁxes the difference-in-differences strategy: such a fix would work only
if the control states’ pre- and post-NCLB policy changes just happened
to produce a constant rate of change in achievement. This is possible but
seems unlikely. Since the dynamics of how achievement reacts to account-
ability are unknown, one cannot even say whether removing a linear time
trend over- or understates the true counterfactual.
Difference-in-differences strategies estimate a treatment effect that is
local to the sort of states being “treated.” If the effect of the NCLB was
heterogeneous, which it surely was given states’ variation in enthusiasm
for implementing the law, the analysis requires treatment and control
groups that are balanced in terms of their susceptibility to the treatment.
Otherwise, the estimated effect does not reveal the population-average
effect, which is largely what interests policymakers. That is, policy-
makers wish to know what the effect of NCLB would be in a state of aver-
age enthusiasm. Few if any policymakers have voiced a wish to know the
effect of NCLB on just those states that balked at implementing account-
ability. Although a local effect of this kind might be interesting to a few
people, it is not what policymakers think they are getting when they ask
what the effect of school accountability is. In practice, estimation of a
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tially understates the population-average effect. It is the econometrician’s
responsibility to insist that readers not interpret a local treatment effect as
a population-average one when it is clear that the control and treatment
groups were poorly balanced in terms of susceptibility to treatment.
In my experience, what interests voters is not even the population-
average treatment effect that NCLB would have had. What interests them
is the effect of a school accountability policy when implemented fairly
faithfully by leaders who believe in it. The voters’ choice is between, 
on the one hand, candidates who run on a platform of accountability and
who would therefore attempt to implement it as intended, and on the other,
candidates who run against accountability and would not implement it.
So far, we have seen no candidates declare that they will implement an
accountability program in a way that deliberately evades its intention.
Before summing up, I must say something about the mismatch between
the empirical strategy the authors describe and the equation they use to
implement it, which is
The authors describe their empirics in terms of dosage: essentially, they
want to allow states that had no accountability program before NCLB to
get the “full dose” of the 2001 law. They want to allow states that had
already taken a full dose of accountability before 2001 to get little or
nothing out of the law. This is reasonable as an explanation, but it suggests
that they will measure dosage by indicators of the degree to which the state
had already, by 2001, implemented the key features of NCLB (statewide
testing, publication of school grades in report cards, highly qualiﬁed teach-
ers, modest forms of school choice). One might also include enthusiasm
for implementation as part of a state’s dosage calculation.
Unfortunately, the estimating equation proxies dosage with Ts, the num-
ber of years a state was without school accountability between the 1991–92
academic year and the onset of NCLB. That is, the authors posit that dosage
was linear in year of implementation, so that if a state’s accountability pro-
gram was implemented one year earlier, its NCLB dosage decreases by
one unit. This speciﬁcation does not match up with reality. First, states that
implemented accountability earlier did not consistently have more ambi-
tious accountability laws. For instance, most commentators would rate
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until 1999–2000, making it a later-than-average implementer among the
control states. Second, making the dose linear in year of implementation is
very restrictive—so restrictive that the estimating equation is not plausibly
eliminating differences in preexisting trends for control states based on
their true dosage, which we have seen is crucial for avoiding bias in the
difference-in-differences estimates. It would be preferable to have a proxy
for dosage that is actually based on measures of the variety and stringency
of the policies implemented.
NCLB, like most laws implemented nationwide, is very difficult to
evaluate because no natural control group exists. What one would need
to evaluate it perfectly is a “twin” United States without the law. Not
having such a twin at their disposal, Dee and Jacob make a valiant effort
to assess the effect of NCLB on student achievement. However, what they
end up estimating is, even under the very optimistic assumption that their
controls for preexisting trends and dosage work perfectly, an unusual
parameter: the effect of school accountability on states that balk at
implementing such laws and can evade them fairly easily. This effect
may interest some, but it understates the effect that school accountabil-
ity has with an average degree of rigor in implementation and probably
greatly understates the effect with faithful implementation.
COMMENT BY
HELEN F. LADD Determining how the 2002 reauthorization of the
federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, commonly called No
Child Left Behind (NCLB), has affected students, teachers, and schools
poses a signiﬁcant challenge because the program was implemented in all
states at the same time. The most straightforward approaches, such as
comparing trends in test scores before and after the introduction of NCLB,
or comparing trends in the United States with those in other countries,
generate conclusions that are at best suggestive because of the potential for
confounding changes.
This paper by Thomas Dee and Brian Jacob makes an important con-
tribution to the literature on NCLB. The authors have made a creative and
valiant, if not completely successful, effort to use an innovative strategy to
investigate the effects of NCLB not only on test scores but also on a num-
ber of mediating mechanisms such as spending and instructional practices.
The authors’ main conclusions are that NCLB generated some positive
gains in mathematics, especially among disadvantaged fourth-graders, but
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a shift of attention toward math and reading within schools. These con-
clusions are generally plausible. At the same time, however, some per-
plexing timing patterns emerge that deserve further attention. In general,
a stronger framing and a richer discussion of the policy implications would
have made an excellent paper even more useful to the current policy
debate.
THE STUDY DESIGN—AND A PERPLEXING FINDING FOR FOURTH-GRADE MATH.
Central to the paper is the authors’ interpretation of which states received
the NCLB “treatment.” Their innovation is to include in the treatment
group only those states that did not have a prior, state-level accountability
system at the time NCLB was introduced. The control group is then
composed of the states that were early adopters of accountability systems,
and the authors pay appropriate attention to when precisely these systems
were adopted. The underlying logic is clear: only in states without existing
accountability systems similar to that of NCLB would the introduction
of NCLB represent a new treatment. Although this strategy is creative, it is
not immune from criticism. Among my concerns are that the authors may
have overstated the similarity of NCLB and the pre-NCLB accountability
systems in many of the control states, and that in the post-NCLB period,
such states may have responded to NCLB in ways that would render their
outcome trends less than ideal measures of what the trends would have
looked like in the treatment states in the absence of NCLB. (As an aside,
I also wonder why the authors did not apply their treatment logic to their
comparison of test scores between public schools and Catholic schools
over time.) In any case, the authors’ main analytical strategy is plausible—
and better than most alternative approaches—but not perfect.
Using this strategy, the authors find the strongest test score gains for
fourth-graders in math. The authors’ analysis of test results is based on
scores on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP),
which is appropriate because the low stakes on this test make the scores far
less subject to manipulation through teaching to the test than would be the
case with the states’ own high-stakes tests. The reliance on NAEP scores,
however, means the authors are working with a small dataset: it includes
only 39 states that had NAEP scores both before and after NCLB, and only
a few years of data because the tests are not given every year. Their fig-
ure 4 shows a very big jump in fourth-grade NAEP scores from 2000 to
2003 in the treatment group relative to the control group, as well as some
differential increase in the growth rates over time, and these patterns are
confirmed by the authors’ regression analysis. Such a large jump over
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which represents the 2002–03 school year, is the ﬁrst year after the intro-
duction of NCLB.
More framing is needed to help the reader evaluate the plausibility of this
big jump and to provide more of a foundation for the rest of the paper.
One perspective is that the accountability mechanism of NCLB was simply
intended to reduce teacher shirking. Such a view is consistent with the brief
principal-agent framing that the authors provide early in the paper. Within
the context of such a perspective, teachers could conceivably raise student
achievement quite quickly. Once teachers are put on notice that they are
accountable for student test scores, for example, they might immediately stop
shirking, and test scores might quickly rise. An alternative view is that NCLB
is best interpreted as a catalyst for a variety of changes that may ultimately
raise test scores but not immediately. Such changes might include, for exam-
ple, increased state and local spending, more professional development for
teachers, changes in instructional processes, or shifts in school schedules
so that teachers can devote more effort to the tested subjects. All of these
changes are likely to take some time to play out. This catalytic view is consis-
tent with other ﬁndings in the paper, including, for example, the ﬁnding that
states raised spending, but it is inconsistent with the empirical ﬁnding of a big
gain in fourth-grade math scores in the ﬁrst year of the program.
Two other considerations are also relevant to the expected timing of any
effects. To the extent that education is a cumulative process, learning in
fourth grade, for example, depends in part on how much children learned
in earlier grades. For that reason, even if the teachers in the early grades
understand the importance of their teaching for student test scores in
subsequent grades and respond to NCLB by changing their practices 
in positive ways, it would take some time for those changes to show up in
the achievement levels of fourth-graders. Moreover, the complexity of
the implementation process should also have led to delayed effects on test
scores. In response to NCLB, many states phased in the required testing
and set up requirements in a way that backloaded the gains necessary to
meet the 2013–14 proﬁciency goal, and sanctions were designed to be min-
imal at ﬁrst and to increase over time. Such timing considerations make me
suspicious of the estimated early gains in fourth-grade math test scores that
emerge from Dee and Jacob’s estimation strategy. Instead I would have
expected at most very small effects in the initial year, with the effects
increasing over time.
INTERPRETING THE MAGNITUDES. Even if we accept Dee and Jacob’s esti-
mates of the NCLB effects on test scores, it is reasonable to ask how one
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that the fourth-grade math effects are large enough to be policy relevant.
They note, for example, that the estimated average gain of 7.2 scale points
is about 24 percent of the black-white gap (but why that is a relevant com-
parison is not clear in this context), and that the gains for Hispanics relative
to those for whites imply a 19 percent reduction in the Hispanic-white gap.
An alternative, policy-motivated answer is that the gains are tiny relative to
the gains needed to get all fourth-graders to 100 percent proﬁciency.
A third possible answer is that the effects are small relative to what
might have been possible with an alternative, more comprehensive policy.
This answer is given support by my table 1, which compares gains in NAEP
scores in Massachusetts between 2000 and 2007 with the average NCLB
“effect” estimated by Dee and Jacob on fourth- and eighth-grade math and
reading scores. I have selected Massachusetts for the comparison because
of the ambitiousness of its 1993 reform package and its highly touted
success in raising test scores. The table shows that Dee and Jacob’s esti-
mated NCLB effects are far smaller than the actual gains achieved in Mass-
achusetts. The estimated 7-point NCLB effect in fourth-grade math falls
far short of the 19-point gain in Massachusetts, and the statistically insignif-
icant 3.3-point effect in eighth-grade math is even further below the corre-
sponding (also 19-point) gain in Massachusetts. In reading, Massachusetts
experienced gains at both grade levels, whereas the NCLB effects are
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Table 1. Gains in NAEP Test Scores in Massachusetts and Dee and Jacob’s Estimated
Effects of NCLB
Score points
Fourth grade Eighth grade
Mathematics
Massachusetts
Average score, 2000 233 279
Average score, 2007 252 298
Change +19 +19




Average score, 1998 223 269
Average score, 2007 236 273
Change +13 +4
National NCLB effect (Dee and Jacob) +2.3 (NS) −2.1 (NS)
Sources: National Center for Education Statistics; Dee and Jacob, this volume, table 1.
a. NS = not statistically signiﬁcant.
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explanation for the different patterns. In contrast to the NCLB reform,
which was narrowly focused on test-based accountability, accountability
was only one small part of a far more comprehensive reform effort in
Massachusetts. This state’s reform package included a substantial increase
in funding (more than doubling in 10 years), new learning standards,
revised student assessments based on clear curriculum frameworks,
revised teacher licensing and professional development programs, and
early childhood programs, as well as parental choice and the creation of
new charter schools. Such a package is far closer to what in the education
literature has been called standards-based reform than what was imple-
mented under NCLB. Although NCLB is an outgrowth of the standards
movement at the national level, it in fact incorporates only one part—
the accountability part—of what was intended to be a far more positive,
constructive, and comprehensive approach to raising the achievement of
all students.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY. I draw several conclusions
from Dee and Jacob’s paper. First, any effects of NCLB on test scores are
small at best. The positive effect of NCLB on average math scores that
emerges from this study occurs too soon relative to what might have been
reasonably predicted, and for that reason may be overstated. Moreover,
even the reported effects are small relative to what Massachusetts has
shown to be feasible. Further, whether there are positive effects on eighth-
grade math is not clear, and no effects on reading emerge at either grade
level. This latter fact is reported in the paper, but its implications are not
discussed. On a brighter note, there may be some positive effects for black
students in fourth-grade (although not in eighth-grade) math and for
Hispanic students in math at both grade levels.
Among the authors’ other ﬁndings is that NCLB appears to have induced
additional state and local spending on education. My interpretation of this
ﬁnding is that there is no free lunch. Stated differently, it is a mistake to
believe that accountability systems can, by themselves and without associ-
ated funding, generate gains in student achievement. In addition, as most
policy analysts would have predicted, NCLB appears to have shifted atten-
tion and resources away from other subjects toward math and reading. The
thorny question, but one that an empirical study of this type cannot answer,
is whether that shift is desirable or undesirable.
So what do such findings imply for policy? The answer is not fully
clear, but my take differs quite sharply from the thoughts the authors
present in the ﬁnal section of the paper. First, the null ﬁndings for reading
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goal for the country, NCLB is clearly not the right approach. That raises
the obvious follow-up question: what is? One possible answer, but one that
goes far beyond the subject of this paper, is that policymakers need to pay
attention to what goes on outside of schools as well as within schools. A
second policy conclusion arises from the suggestive evidence that I
have included here on Massachusetts, namely, that states may be in a bet-
ter position to promote student achievement than the federal government.
That raises the question of how the federal government can best encourage
the states to engage in signiﬁcant comprehensive reform efforts. My read-
ing of Dee and Jacob’s paper is that NCLB is far from the best approach
for the federal government to pursue.
GENERAL DISCUSSION Brian Knight observed that although limited
information is available on the paper’s control group, the analysis would
be improved by making the control and treatment groups as comparable as
the data allow. He wondered whether there was any additional variation
that could be exploited in choosing these groups. Knight was also struck
by the reported increase in spending per pupil after NCLB and was curi-
ous whether there were heterogeneous effects, particularly at the state and
local levels. He was interested in knowing more about the incidence of the
spending increase, and in particular whether it fell mostly on state taxpay-
ers or was paid for by cutting back other state spending.
Christopher Jencks found one of the paper’s results, the effect of NCLB
on fourth-grade mathematics scores in the first year of the policy change,
to be implausibly large. Although math scores should have increased dur-
ing this period, for the result to be convincing it was necessary to rule out
other causes, such as differences in the content of the test over time. James
Hines, however, found the results on fourth-grade math scores plausible and
argued that it was not necessary to impose a linear trend.
Kristin Forbes found the different observed impacts of NCLB on math
and reading scores interesting and wondered whether there was any theory
that would have predicted this difference. Have any other countries under-
taken similar reforms and observed this type of differential effect? An
analysis of why NCLB has had a stronger impact on math than on reading
could be important in understanding how NCLB has worked and what
other types of educational reforms are likely to be the most effective.
Erik Hurst wondered what the proper way to specify the production
function for human capital would be in this context. He was also interested
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graduation rates and the incomes of graduates.
Caroline Hoxby spoke in defense of NCLB, noting that the law was
intended to be similar to those previously implemented in reformist states.
She thought most people would like to know what would have been the
effect of NCLB on the average state—that is, on a state that had a typical
amount of enthusiasm for implementing school accountability. This effect
could be approximated by averaging two estimates: ﬁrst, the estimated
effect of school accountability laws in states that implemented them before
NCLB (the enthusiastic implementer effect), and second, the estimated
effect of NCLB in states that had no accountability law before NCLB (the
unenthusiastic implementer effect). She observed further that math and
reading are very different subjects, and that math is almost entirely taught at
school whereas parents have a much bigger impact on reading, so that the
disparate effects of NCLB on the two subjects were plausible.
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen noted that migration rates have differed
across booms and recessions. These could affect the results for the impact
of NCLB among Hispanic students. She also wondered about possible
cohort effects, noting that such an effect could be occurring in the math
results presented in the paper’s ﬁgure 4. Students included at any year in
the top panel would enter the bottom panel 4 years later.
Christopher Jencks agreed with the authors that NCLB is difficult to
evaluate statistically since it was implemented all at once. However, some
states set the standard for student proﬁciency quite high, so many students
would have to learn more for a school’s performance to be judged accept-
able, while other states set low standards so that relatively few students
would have to learn more for a school’s performance to be judged accept-
able. One would expect NCLB to have less of an impact in states where
schools did not have to improve most students’ performance. On the differ-
ence in results between math and reading, given that kids do not learn math
on their own before going to school, as Hoxby had noted, one might have
expected that family background would have more of an effect on reading
than on math, but that prediction does not hold up in the authors’ results.
Helen Ladd wondered whether the different results for reading than
for math might have less to do with the differences between the subjects
themselves than with the tests used to measure proficiency. State-level
results using state tests have shown gains in reading that do not show up
in the NAEP. If math curriculums are closer to what is tested on the NAEP
than reading curriculums, the results might not come through as well for
reading. Ladd also thought it worth noting that test scores are only part of
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measures of success besides achievement, such as graduation rates and
college attendance, as Hurst had noted.
Adele Morris remarked that although the paper found no evidence that
NCLB harmed students at the high end of the achievement scale, it might
be worth taking a second look, particularly at the very highest level. One
current debate about NCLB is the degree to which it could reduce the
resources that schools devote to the education of gifted learners. To
explore this, the authors could examine the dependent variable at the 95th
percentile or higher for the NAEP score, as well as explore the effect of
NCLB on expenditure on programs for the gifted.
Melissa Kearney commented that many observers have questioned
whether the magnitude of the effect found for NCLB on fourth-grade math
test scores is credible. Presumably there is a sizable empirical literature
estimating the effects of earlier experimentation with accountability at the
state level. Were the effects the authors found in line with those estimates?
Or are previous estimates so small that there would have to be large general
equilibrium effects in order for the paper’s estimates to be right?
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